⚠ Simulation Only: All characters, companies, and emails are fictional. For educational purposes only.
🎯 Critical Targeted Social Engineering

Spear Phishing

Unlike generic phishing, spear phishing is precisely targeted. Attackers research their victim on LinkedIn, company websites, and social media to craft a convincing, personalised message.

1
The Bait
2
The Reveal
3
The Defence

🎣 Phase 1 — The Bait

You are Alex Johnson, a Senior Developer at Acme Corp. You just received this email. Does it raise any suspicion?

ATTACKER'S OSINT PROFILE — Info Gathered Before Sending
Target Name:
Alex Johnson
Company:
Acme Corp
Role (LinkedIn):
Senior Developer
Manager (LinkedIn):
Sarah Mitchell
Current Project (GitHub):
Project Helios
Email (Guessed):
a.johnson@acmecorp.com

🔍 Phase 2 — The Reveal

This was a targeted attack. The attacker used OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) to make it feel completely real. Here's how they did it and where it broke down.

🚩
1. Wrong Domain — "acme-corp-support.com" vs. "acmecorp.com"
The email came from acme-corp-support.com — a lookalike domain registered by the attacker. Legitimate IT never emails from external domains. All internal comms come from @acmecorp.com.
🚩
2. Weaponised Personal Information (OSINT)
The attacker researched your name, manager's name (Sarah Mitchell), and your current project (Project Helios) from LinkedIn and GitHub. This information makes the email feel authentic, but it's all publicly available data harvested by the attacker.
🚩
3. Urgency + Deadline Pressure
"Expires at 5 PM today", "locked until Monday" — manufacturing a time crunch prevents you from pausing to verify. Attackers know that urgency bypasses rational thinking.
🚩
4. Requesting Active Directory (AD) Credentials
Legitimate MFA resets never ask for your existing "Active Directory credentials" via a web portal link in email. Real IT resets are initiated from within the company's own systems or done in-person.
🚩
5. "David Chen" Doesn't Exist (or is Impersonated)
Any attacker can write any name in an email signature. The Teams handle @david.chen-it and phone extension are fabricated. Always verify IT requests through the company directory — not contact details in the email itself.

🛡️ Phase 3 — Defending Against Spear Phishing

  • Verify any IT request through a separate, trusted channel — call the helpdesk using the number from the company directory, not the email.
  • Check the sending domain carefully. IT will always send from your company's own domain (@yourcompany.com).
  • Reduce your public OSINT footprint: review your LinkedIn privacy settings and limit what project details you share publicly on GitHub.
  • Legitimate MFA resets are never done via clicking a link in an email — they're initiated through secure internal portals or by IT directly.
  • Apply the "slow down" rule: whenever an email creates urgency, that's your signal to verify — not to comply.
  • Use hardware security keys (YubiKey, etc.) for MFA — they're phishing-resistant and won't authenticate on fake domains.
  • Attend regular security awareness training — spear phishing success drops significantly with educated employees.

OSINT Sources Attackers Exploit

💼
LinkedIn
Name, role, manager, projects, colleagues
🐙
GitHub
Project names, tech stack, commit history
🌐
Company Website
Email format, org structure, press releases
🐦
Social Media
Interests, location, events, relationships